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THE IMPACT OF VEHICLE TOLLS ON HAMPTON ROADS:
JOB MOBILITY, RESIDENTIAL LIVING CHOICES AND
REGIONAL COHESION

V

ehicle tolls are nothing new in Hampton Roads. Both the Downtown Tunnel (DTT), which opened in 1952, and the Midtown Tunnel (MTT), which opened
in 1962, extracted 25-cent tolls from drivers of vehicles passing through them until 1986. The Virginia Beach Expressway (now I-264) opened in 1967
and was funded with tolls as high as 25 cents for passenger cars and a bit higher on a per axle basis for trucks. These tolls were removed in 1996.

The Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT) extracted a $1.25 toll from
automobiles between 1957 and 1976.
The Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (CBBT) has been tolled since it opened in
1964. Currently, that toll is $13 for passenger cars for a single trip, $26 for a
three-axle truck and $47 for a six-axle truck. Repeat travelers qualify for much
lower tolls.

even the widening of I-64 to Richmond, by means of tolls. Finally, this project
has caused both members of the public and legislators to take a closer look at
the Public-Private Partnership Act of 1995, which enabled the current project
and its surrounding financial arrangements.

Now, we have a new set of tolls – this time on the DTT, MTT and the Martin
Luther King Freeway (MLK). The tolls are designed to help pay for a $2.16
billion transportation improvement project negotiated by the Commonwealth
of Virginia under the aegis of the Public/Private Partnership Act of 1995. The
centerpiece of the project is a new tunnel tube for the MTT that will improve
traffic flow between Norfolk and Portsmouth, as well as to points west and
south. The new tube will increase the MTT to four lanes and presumably
expedite traffic going to and from the Sentara/Eastern Virginia Medical School
health complex, Old Dominion University, the port and Naval Base Norfolk.

What are the new DTT, MTT and MLK tolls? While

More than a little controversy has accompanied this project because at least
one study has suggested that the adverse impact of new vehicle tolls would be
especially large for the city of Portsmouth.1 The new tolling arrangement also has
pushed to the forefront questions about the viability of any regional strategy that
would pay for a new (third) crossing over the James River estuary, and perhaps

E-ZPass transponder will pay triple these amounts.

1

James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014. The report may be
accessed at www.jamesvkoch.com under the “Consulting Reports” icon.
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lower initially, beginning in 2016, drivers of passenger cars
going through either the DTT or MTT tunnel will pay
$1.84 during peak hours, while drivers of trucks will pay
$7.36. During off-peak hours, they will pay $1.59 and $4.77,
respectively. MLK tolls will be 50 cents for tunnel users
and $1 for non-tunnel users. However, these are E-ZPass
(electronic) rates and drivers of vehicles without an

The Public-Private
Partnership Act Of 1995
The tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK are one product of a 58-year
“Comprehensive Agreement” between the Commonwealth of Virginia and
Elizabeth River Crossing OpCo (ERCO),2 made possible under provisions of the
1995 Public-Private Transportation Act (PPTA).3 This particular agreement took
effect in 2012 and has been amended since then.
The Comprehensive Agreement with ERCO included the construction of a
second MTT tunnel tube (increasing it to four lanes), extending the MLK Freeway
from High Street to I-264, and rehabilitating the existing DTT and MTT tunnels.
The advertised total cost of these projects was $2.16 billion.
The primary impetus for the PPTA was the apparent inability of the
Commonwealth to finance most of the large transportation infrastructure
projects that legislators and citizens wished to pursue. Hence, in the PPTA, the
Commonwealth turned to the private sector for help. It is not clear that, at the
time, all concerned understood that private-sector investors/operators would
demand a rate of return on their invested capital that would be competitive in
the milieu of large, private-sector corporations. This would not be a world of
3 percent interest rates on 10-year U.S. government bonds.

to earn 13.5 percent on its invested capital. If that rate of return does not
materialize because competing facilities have been constructed by the
Commonwealth, then the Commonwealth must compensate ERCO for the
shortfall. However, if ERCO’s revenues exceed forecasts (implicitly, the 13.5
percent rate of return), then ERCO will share a portion of the excess with the
Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT). The percentage share of excess
gross revenues increases as the amount of gross revenues earned by ERCO
increases.4 VDOT is required by law to use the shared revenue on transportation
improvements in the corridor.
The Comprehensive Agreement gives ERCO the authority to raise tolls 3.5
percent annually if it wishes to do so, beginning in 2016. However, if the
annual growth rate of the consumer price index (CPI) in the preceding 12
months was higher than 3.5 percent, then ERCO may choose to increase its tolls
by that percentage. Assuming that ERCO takes advantage of these provisions,
this means, at a minimum, that the peak hours and non-peak
hours tolls for passenger vehicles would rise to at least $11.79
and $8.71, respectively, by 2070. (Peak hours are defined as
5:30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.) Comparable truck
tolls would rise to at least $47.17 and $30.57, respectively, by
2070. As we will soon see, because of the CPI provision, tolls
actually are likely to rise much more than these amounts.

The PPTA delegates responsibility for developing and approving public-private
transportation partnerships to the governor, who in turn may delegate that
responsibility to another individual, such as the secretary of transportation.
As of this writing, approval of the Virginia General Assembly is not required,
regardless of the size of the project.
ERCO is responsible for collecting tolls and for achieving the traffic volumes
outlined in its forecasts, which may be a bit optimistic. While there is no
guaranteed rate of return for ERCO on its investment, ERCO is authorized
2

3

 RCO’s lead firms are Skanska Infrastructure Development and Macquarie Group, both of which are publicE
private partnership (PPP) developers and infrastructure investors as well as operators throughout the world. For
more information about ERCO, see www.erc-info.com.
Among completed Virginia PPP projects are: the Pocahontas Parkway (Route 895) across the James River, south
of Richmond; a 17.5-mile stretch of Route 288 west of Richmond; and the Route 199 partial loops around
Williamsburg.
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If gross revenues exceed baseline forecasts from 5% to 10%, 10% to 20%, 20% to 30% and in excess of 30%,
then VDOT will share 5%, 15%, 30% and 60%, respectively. ERCO may earn gross revenues up to 5% in excess
of baseline forecasts before VDOT shares in profits.
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The Positive Overall
Economic Impact Of The
Newly Tolled Project
There is a tendency for the supporters of toll-financed projects to neglect the
costs associated with those projects and for the opponents of toll-financed
projects to neglect the benefits of the same projects. Reality is that both benefits
and costs are generated by toll-financed projects such as the DTT/MTT/MLK
undertaking in Hampton Roads.
Let’s focus for a moment on the primary benefits typically associated with a new
toll project:
• Reduced travel times
• Increased trip and travel reliability
• Reduced traffic congestion
• Increased fuel economy
• Reduced vehicle operating costs
• Reduced carbon emissions and diminished environmental harm
•A
 s many as 1,500 additional jobs and associated increased incomes
connected to construction.
At least five reputable studies have documented that some or all of these benefits
will be associated with the DTT/MTT/MLK tolling project. For example, The
Hartgen Group estimates that after completion, the project will increase the
gross regional product of Hampton Roads by an incremental $365 million to
$390 million annually and in the process create 4,401 additional jobs.5 “West
Side” benefits that will accrue are estimated by Hartgen to range between
$144 million and $148 million, along with 1,736 jobs. The Hartgen Group

also estimated that the increased reliability of travel time across the Elizabeth
River will have a median value of $63 million to the region.6
Reputable analysts attribute significant financial benefits to the completion of the
DTT/MTT/MLK project. It also is fair to say that the analytic consensus is that the
project will yield significant benefits to the region and the Commonwealth. This,
however, is not the same as saying that the benefits and costs of the project will
be spread evenly (or equitably) across the region, or even that the benefits and
costs will be spread evenly (or equitably) among the residents and businesses
inside a specific city.

We Live In An Economically
Interdependent Region
Both the benefits and the costs of the DTT/MTT/MLK accruing to any city
depend substantially on how many people in those cities will use these venues
and end up paying tolls, either because they leave a city (perhaps Suffolk) to
work in another, or because people in other cities leave those cities to come
work in this city (Suffolk). Table 1 reports U.S. Census data describing where
people live and where they work in Hampton Roads.
Reading down the columns, one can see to whom each city or county is
supplying workers. Taking Newport News as an example, one can see that
this city supplies 13,744 people who work in Hampton; 40,661 workers
in Newport News remain there for their jobs; 5,236 go to work in Norfolk;
3,724 travel to work in Virginia Beach; and 15,062 workers are employed
outside of Hampton Roads.
Reading across the rows, one can discover where a city or county’s workers
come from. Virginia Beach, for example, receives 23,138 workers from
Norfolk; 6,925 from Portsmouth; 10,727 from Hampton Roads locations north
of the James River;7 and 29,576 workers from outside Hampton Roads.
6

5

“ Impacts of Mid-Town Tunnel Improvements on Regional Productivity and Job Mobility,” The Hartgen Group
(2009), p. 3, www.hartgengroup.net
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7

“Value of Improvements in the Reliability of Travel Time Resulting from MTT Improvements,” The Hartgen Group
(2009), p. 2, www.hartgengroup.net
These workers travel to Virginia Beach from Gloucester County, James City County, Mathews County, York
County, Hampton, Newport News, Poquoson and Williamsburg.

TABLE 1
WHERE PEOPLE LIVE AND WORK IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2011

Currituck County,
N.C.

Franklin

Gloucester County

Isle of Wight
County

James City County

Mathews County

Southampton
County

Surry County

York County

Chesapeake

Hampton

Newport News

Norfolk

Poquoson

Portsmouth

Suffolk

Virginia Beach

Williamsburg

Outside Hampton
Roads

Workers Live Here

Currituck County, N.C.

7,482

2,693

12

-

12

1

1

1

-

7

385

11

11

54

1

47

52

335

3

3,856

Franklin

13,545

20

2,847

30

860

57

20

3,329

90

47

345

60

204

194

13

355

1,372

281

-

3,422

Gloucester County

13,206

3

5

5,550

61

428

665

28

2

489

116

317

972

127

75

116

99

280

54

3,819

Isle of Wight County

14,025

36

184

20

4,265

183

38

441

320

164

547

807

1,381

285

36

731

1,836

293

20

2,435

James City County

37,618

16

38

1,363

310

12,055

286

82

329

2,869

418

1,269

4,827

347

234

356

401

757

1,130

10,532

Mathews County

2,045

4

4

267

4

28

711

-

2

37

22

37

66

13

9

7

9

17

2

808

Southampton County

3,543

4

327

4

153

4

-

1,554

40

8

46

12

20

32

1

58

120

43

1

1,116

Surry County

3,113

3

5

48

258

115

11

41

726

89

117

79

171

35

16

50

83

138

11

1,115

York County

28,992

8

28

1,695

417

3,388

208

63

74

6,067

446

2,380

5,347

428

613

428

391

828

526

5,656

Chesapeake

132,806

1,777

97

478

1,441

701

104

178

70

15

41,070

3,162

3,288

13,226

137

9,498

6,504

30,394

129

20,535

Hampton

76,504

43

40

1,130

1,717

1,833

189

70

30

5,047

3,469

23,816

13,744

3,910

1,634

1,956

2,103

5,088

213

10,471

Job Located In

Number
of Jobs

Newport News

134,154

116

127

4,822

4,837

4,463

662

246

102

10,072

4,819

21,508

40,661

3,973

2,193

3,518

4,659

6,376

463

20,537

Norfolk

192,051

1,086

63

106

1,742

1,334

183

163

65

1,432

27,297

6,484

5,236

50,825

285

10,249

6,909

52,164

228

26,201

Poquoson

2,410

1

50

35

40

5

4

291

50

297

344

37

875

32

33

80

3

232

Portsmouth

61,237

392

50

131

1,312

255

34

92

38

304

11,722

1,721

1,881

6,044

44

16,620

5,065

8,466

38

7,027

-

-

Suffolk

37,179

155

447

222

2,074

333

40

825

101

368

4,341

885

1,355

1,710

76

3,015

12,107

2,905

29

6,193

Virginia Beach

229,365

1,621

-

612

1,329

1,130

137

179

-

1,082

25,843

3,631

3,724

23,138

196

6,925

4,790

125,237

215

29,576

Williamsburg

19,123

5

13

921

145

5,679

105

41

174

2,078

205

686

3,162

212

125

196

184

348

1,407

3,437

5,045

2,163

2,151

320

1,935

1948.4

5,314

1,794

11,600

15,274

11,424

15,062

16,090

2,201

477

16,026

32,761

2,591

-

13,027

6,451

19,600

21,293

33,962

5,347

12,652

3,958

42,067

136,532

78,584

101,456

120,681

8,765

54,634

62,745

266,790

7,062

Outside Hampton
Roads
1,008,398

-

156,968

Sources: U
 .S. Census Bureau, 2013: OnTheMap Application. Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics Program. http://onthemap.ces.census.gov
http://lehd.ces.census.gov/applications/help/onthemap.html#!what_is_onthemap
Jobs are “primary jobs,” and include military personnel and self-employed.
Primary jobs: Public- and private-sector jobs, one job per worker. A primary job is the highest-paying job for an individual worker.
Source of jobs data: “Civilian Labor Force and Unemployment by Census Region and Division, Seasonally Adjusted,” www.bea.gov
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The import of the numbers in Table 1 is inescapable:
•E
 conomically speaking, we are a highly interdependent region – most of our
workers live in one city or county, but work in another. Fully 64.9 percent of
our workers leave their home city or county when they go to their jobs.
•E
 ven Norfolk, bolstered by its traditional role as a headquarters site and job
magnet, finds that 57.9 percent of its employed residents work in a different
city or county.
•M
 any of our workers “cross the water” in north-south directions. An estimated
71,000 people holding jobs in Hampton Roads cross the James River estuary
every day to and from Hampton and Newport News to go to work.8 They
account for approximately 120,000 daily trips.
• Business and delivery trucks crossing the James River to and from Hampton
and Newport News add approximately 70,000 daily trips to this number on
a typical day.
• Many of our workers also “cross the water” in east-west directions. Roughly
85,000 people (8.5 percent) move between eastern Hampton Roads and
western Hampton Roads as they travel to work. About two-thirds of them
utilize the DTT and/or MTT when they do so. This activity accounts for
approximately 140,000 daily trips.
• Business and delivery trucks (for example, those emanating from the port) add
an approximate additional 75,000 trips to this east-west number.9
Some important deductions spring from these data. Approximately 25
percent of all workers in the region are tied to jobs that
require them to commute over bridges and tunnels to their
jobs, or whose jobs require them to make business and
delivery trips that utilize the same crossings. To the extent that
drivers must pay high tolls when they utilize these venues,
we risk dividing our region into three parts: Eastern Hampton
Roads (Norfolk and Virginia Beach), Western Hampton Roads
Approximately 20 percent of individuals utilize car pools or public transportation, or telecommute, thus reducing
the actual number of trips undertaken.
The business and delivery trip estimates are based upon the Koch study cited in footnote 1 and are based upon,
inter alia, an actual physical count of the types of vehicles entering the DTT and MTT.

8 

9

96

THE STATE OF THE REGION | HAMPTON ROADS 2014

(Portsmouth, Suffolk and points west) and the Peninsula. Only
Chesapeake would appear to be situated in such a way that its drivers would
not have to access the DTT and MTT with any frequency. However, Chesapeake
drivers, like all others Southside, would have to pay to get to the Peninsula if
those crossings were to become tolled.
Nearly two and a half centuries ago, in 1776, Adam Smith, in his “An Inquiry
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” noted how the division
and specialization of labor and general economic prosperity were tied to the
size of available markets. This is among the reasons Smith was a free trader.
He objected to tariffs and taxes that prevented consumers and businesses from
making mutually profitable connections. A toll may be viewed as a tariff (tax)
on movement. Were he alive today, Smith likely would eschew tolls in favor of
other means of funding road, bridge and tunnel improvements.
If we impose high tolls on bridges and tunnels in Hampton Roads and separate
our regional market into three distinct and perhaps competing parts, then there
will be consequences. The size of our labor pool will shrink as
workers decline to pay the tolls necessary to commute over
bridges and tunnels. This will mean some employees will have
to settle for lower wages and some employers won’t be able
to hire the best possible employees. Businesses will find that
the number of customers to whom they have easy access will
decline. Customers will have an incentive to find alternate, less
expensive suppliers, perhaps using the Internet to fuel their
searches. This is a recipe for economic decline.

How high is “high” when we are talking about tolls? In
2016, drivers of passenger cars will pay $1.84 during peak
hours to drive through either the DTT or MTT. Workers/
drivers that do so twice a day, 250 days per year (and
perhaps throw in a couple of more passages per month
for other purposes) will spend about $1,000 per year on
these tolls. This is approximately 2.2 percent of the median
household income in the cities of Portsmouth and Norfolk
and, based upon studies in other metropolitan areas, it is
sufficient to change behavior. Tolls that extract 1 percent
or less of median household income annually appear to be
regarded by most drivers as a nuisance, but do not often
change decisions about where they choose to work, live or
spend leisure time.

The Relative Burden Of
The Tolls
Only a brief glance at the Table 1 commuting matrix is needed to see that the
imposition of tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK will not have much impact on the
Peninsula. It’s true that 1,721 Hampton residents commute to Portsmouth for
their jobs and 1,956 Portsmouth residents commute to Hampton for their work.
Some of these 3,677 people may have to pay the tolls, though many of them
may choose the “back side” commuting path of some combination of I-664,
I-264, State Route 164 and U.S. Route 17 to travel to their jobs. Virtually all
who reside in Newport News or to the north will be able to exercise the same,
toll-free option.
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Not surprisingly, the primary burden of the tolls will fall upon four Southside
cities: Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach. Of these cities, easily the
largest burden will fall upon those who live or work in Portsmouth and must travel
back and forth through the DTT or MTT to get to their jobs and return home.
Table 1 illustrates Portsmouth’s exposed situation. Fully 10,249 people live in
Portsmouth and work in Norfolk; 6,044 do the reverse. Another 6,925 people
live in Portsmouth and work in Virginia Beach, while 8,466 reverse that flow.
When one adds the very few individuals that live or work in Chesapeake or
Currituck County, but nevertheless use the DTT and MTT, a total of 32,279
people likely will use the DTT and MTT to go to work in and out of Portsmouth.
Portsmouth’s job base of 61,237 is an approximate measure of the size of
its economy. A rough-and-ready measure of the impact of the new tolls on
Portsmouth is the percentage (52.7 percent) of the city’s “in and out” commuters
among its job base.
How does this compare to the other Southside cities that primarily will be
affected by the tolls? Graph 1 indexes the impact the tolls will have on Norfolk,
Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach as the percentage of each city’s job
base consisting of “in and out” commuters that must use the DTT and MTT to go
back and forth to work. The impact is least on Virginia Beach. While Table 1
discloses that an estimated 6,925 + 8,466 = 15,391 people will be “in and
out” commuters to and from Virginia Beach and Portsmouth, Suffolk and points
west (and hence probably must use the DTT and MTT), this is only 6.7 percent
of Virginia Beach’s substantial job base of 229,365.
Graph 1 indexes Virginia Beach’s percentage at 1.00. Norfolk slides in
above Virginia Beach with an index of 1.15, followed by Suffolk at 3.45 and
Portsmouth at 4.12. In relative terms, the impact of the tolls will be more than
four times greater upon Portsmouth than on Virginia Beach. The relative impact
of the DTT and MTT tolls upon Chesapeake and the cities and counties on the
Peninsula is minuscule by comparison.
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Graph 1
GRAPH 1

Relative Burden of the New Tolls
RELATIVE BURDEN OF THE NEW TOLLS UPON SOUTHSIDE HAMPTON ROADS CITIES
Upon Southside Hampton Roads Cities
4.50
4.00
Relative Burden of the New Tolls

Relative
Burden
of the
New
Tolls

4.12

3.50

3.45

3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00

1.00

1.15

0.50
0.00

Virginia Beach

Norfolk

Suffolk

Graph 2
Growth of Passenger Vehicle Tolls, 2016 Through 2070
(Assuming Annual Increases of 3.5 Percent or the CPI, Whichever Is Greater)
Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
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Portsmouth

Future Increases In Tolls For
The DTT And MTT
The Commonwealth’s agreement with Elizabeth River Crossings permits ERCO to
increase tolls by 3.5 percent annually, or the growth in the consumer price index
over the trailing 12 months, if that is higher. As Graph 2 illustrates, this means
that the $1.84 peak-time toll for passenger cars would increase to $11.79 in
2070 if tolls increased at only 3.5 percent annually, but would jump to $21.56
if the growth in the CPI between now and 2070 matched what was true
between 1956 and 2014. During that 58-year time period, the annual growth
in the CPI was higher than 3.5 percent on 24 occasions.
Specifically, past CPI growth suggests that tolls will increase at an average of
4.66 percent per year, not 3.5 percent. Thanks to the miracle of compound
growth, this would increase ERCO’s total revenue by slightly more than 82
percent over the 3.5 percent scenario.10
Graph 3 reveals that the $7.36 peak-hour toll that trucks will pay in 2016
will grow to $47.17 if tolls increase at only 3.5 percent annually, but to a
stupendous $86.24 if they grow at the aforementioned 4.66 percent annually.
It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which such tolls inhibit economic
activity in Hampton Roads.

10

James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014.
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GRAPH 2
GROWTH OF PASSENGER VEHICLE TOLLS, 2016 THROUGH 2070
(ASSUMING ANNUAL INCREASES OF 3.5 PERCENT OR THE CPI, WHICHEVER IS GREATER)

$25
$21.56
2070

$20

Growing
at 3.5%
or the CPI
Annually,
Whichever
is Greater

$15
$11.79
2070

$10

Growing
at 3.5%
$5
$1.84
$0

2016
Tolling Year and Index

Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
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GRAPH 3
GROWTH OF TRUCK TOLLS, 2016 THROUGH 2070
(ASSUMING ANNUAL INCREASES OF 3.5 PERCENT OR THE CPI, WHICHEVER IS GREATER)

$100
$86.24

Peak Tolls for Trucks

$90
$80

2070

$70

Growing at
3.5% or the
CPI Annually,
Whichever is
Greater

$60
$47.17

$50

2070

$40

Growing at 3.5%
Annually

$30
$20
$10
$0

$7.36
2016
Tolling Year and Index

Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
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The Key Role Of
Discretionary Drivers
Table 2 reveals that 32,279 people potentially will go “in and out” of
Portsmouth daily because of their jobs. If they make round trips, this means there
are 64,558 potential trips made daily through the tunnels by workers. Some,
however, will carpool; others will use mass public transportation. Still others
may telecommute. Based upon the experience of other metropolitan areas, 20
percent is an approximate estimate of the number of people that will utilize these
alternatives.
An estimated 25,000 vehicle trips through the tunnels reflect trucks and business
vehicles plying their trades on a daily basis. Since the average number of total
trips through the two tunnels is approximately 125,000 (about 70 percent
through the DTT), this leaves approximately 50,000 “discretionary” trips daily
that do not relate to job commuting or the activities of businesses.11 It is these
individuals who are most likely to be negatively influenced by the new tolls.
They are people who drive through the tunnels for sundry purposes – shopping,
recreation, excursions to restaurants and churches, visits to friends and transit to
other locales.
Discretionary drivers are more likely to utilize the tunnels
during non-peak hours because they have no need to drive
during the most congested and more expensive peak hours
(5:30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.). Preliminary evidence
on tunnel traffic immediately after the imposition of tolls on Feb. 1, 2014,
revealed that the decline in traffic was much larger during non-peak hours than
peak hours (Dave Forster, “Traffic Surges to Gilmerton, High-Rise After Tunnel
Tolls,” The Virginian-Pilot, Feb. 14, 2014). This is precisely the reaction one
would expect. Those that don’t really need to pay the tolls are the ones most
likely to decide to stay home, or to relocate their activities closer to their home
bases.

11

James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY COMMUTING MATRIX FOR PORTSMOUTH, 2011
Downtown and Midtown Only
From Portsmouth

Into Portsmouth

95

117

10,249

6,044

6,925

8,466

Currituck County, N.C.

24

196

Outside Hampton Roads

24

351

17,317

15,174

Chesapeake
Norfolk
Virginia Beach

Totals

“In and Out” total is 32,491, which is 53.1 percent of Portsmouth’s
job base of 61,237.
All Tolled: DTT, MTT, HRBT, MMMBT, RT17
From Portsmouth

Into Portsmouth

95

117

10,249

6,044

6,925

8,466

24

196

116

131

7

34

428

304

Hampton

1,956

1,721

Newport News

3,518

1,881

32

44

196

38

95

1,405

23,641

20,381

Chesapeake
Norfolk
Virginia Beach
Currituck County
Gloucester County
Mathews County
York County

Poquoson
Williamsburg
Outside Hampton Roads
Totals

“In and Out” total is 44,022, which is 71.9 percent of Portsmouth’s
job base of 61,237.
Note: Downtown Tunnel (DTT), Midtown Tunnel (MTT), Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT), Monitor-Merrimac
Memorial Bridge-Tunnel (MMMBT) and James River Bridge (RT17)
Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014

To the extent that discretionary drivers avoid the tolled tunnels, this will inflict
financial injury upon Southside businesses that have regional rather than local
clienteles. Consider a restaurant in Olde Towne Portsmouth, an area that
attracts a significant portion of its guests from outside of the city. Suppose the
average tab paid by a diner is $35 (counting both lunch and dinner). Then, in
2016, the $1.84 x 2 = $3.68 tolls paid by the diner would be equivalent to
a 10.5 percent tax on that dining experience. This is not a recipe for success.
Contemporary estimates of “price elasticity of demand” (the sensitivity of
consumers to price changes) suggest that such a 10.5 percent increase in price
because of the tolls would result in an 8 percent to 12 percent decline in sales
revenue (holding everything else, such as Department of Defense expenditures
and general prosperity, constant).

Future Traffic Volumes
Through The DTT And MTT

The financial injury does not end there. Let’s once again focus on Portsmouth.
Each 1 percent decline in sales tax collections will cost the city of Portsmouth
$6 million annually. Further, declining sales and profits eventually will reduce the
value of the city’s businesses and the properties where they are located. Each
1 percent decline in the assessed valuation of properties in the city of Portsmouth
will reduce its tax collections by about $900,000. Of course, Portsmouth’s loss
could become another city’s gain.

Steer, Davies and Gleave opined that a 24 percent to 48 percent immediate
decline in tunnel traffic might occur because of a “shock effect.” The actual
declines in tunnel traffic that occurred in February 2014, while substantial, were
not this large. The consulting firm predicts slow, gradual growth in traffic once
drivers adjust to tolls.

While Portsmouth is the Southside city most vulnerable to
the tolls, other cities such as Norfolk also attract many of
the discretionary drivers that utilize the tunnels to travel to
businesses and restaurants in Norfolk, patronize regional
attractions such as the Chrysler Museum of Art, the Norfolk
Tides and the Norfolk Admirals, or drive to educational
institutions such as Tidewater Community College, Norfolk
State University and Old Dominion University. Indeed, because
of its long-standing status as a cultural, legal, financial and
educational center for Hampton Roads, Norfolk appears to
attract a higher proportion of discretionary travelers than any
other city in the region. Hence, it will not escape the burden of
the tolls.
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Estimation of traffic volumes when new tolls are imposed upon a travel venue
is somewhat speculative simply because the tolls represent something entirely
new as opposed to an increase in price of something that already exists. The
Commonwealth commissioned several consultants and agencies to provide
traffic estimates through the DTT and MTT. Among them was Steer, Davies and
Gleave, whose 2010 report and final report in March 2012 estimated traffic
flows through 2070: “Downtown Tunnel/Midtown Tunnel/Martin Luther King
Freeway (MLK) Extension: Traffic and Revenue Forecasts.”

“Drop in Traffic Takes Toll on Investors in Private Roads,”
reported The Wall Street Journal on Nov. 20, 2013. The
WSJ’s Ryan Dezember and Emily Glazer noted that traffic
volume projections often have been overly optimistic on
privately owned or operated toll projects.
Straightforward economic analysis suggests that the typical
passenger car driver eventually will decide to pay the tolls.
Suppose the value of a driver’s time is $10 per hour and that
avoiding the tunnels adds 30 minutes to the length of a trip
across the Elizabeth River. The value of those extra 30 minutes
to this typical driver is .5($10) = $5, which is substantially
higher than either the $1 toll in 2014, or the $1.84 toll in
2016. Hence, an armchair prediction is that the typical driver
will grumble and perhaps attempt to minimize his/her trips,
but ultimately will decide that driving through the tunnels
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(and paying the tolls) is cost efficient after all. Still, this will be
less true for discretionary drivers than for job commuters and
businesses.

Nightmare On Elm Street:
Tolling The James River
Crossings
“My recommendation would be to toll all 4 crossings with
electronic toll collection, with dynamic pricing (congestion
pricing, with all the revenues utilized only on the 4 crossings)
based on time-of-day and day-of-week, designed to optimize
the usage of all 4 crossings, with a price structure that would
pay for the entire total cost (debt service on toll revenue bonds)
of the Third Hampton Roads Crossing project, justifying the
re-tolling of the JRB and HRBT on the basis that the Third
Crossing would provide them traffic relief as well as revenues for
maintenance, and for providing an adjustable optimal traffic
balance over all 4 crossings.” Scott M. Kozel, “Roads to the

quite simply neither the Commonwealth nor the region possessed such a revenue
source.
Refer back to the commuting matrix data found in Table 1. Let’s use Hampton
as an instructive example. As Table 3 reveals, a total of 15,883 people live
in Hampton, but are employed in the five major Southside cities: Chesapeake,
Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach. It would be nearly impossible
for these commuters to avoid paying tolls unless they carpool, use mass
transportation or telecommute. There also is a reverse flow: 16,526 people
live in one of the five Southside cities, but are employed in Hampton. Hence, a
total of 32,409 people with connections to Hampton would be affected by tolls
on RT17, MMMBT and HRBT. The comparable number for Newport News is
38,829. The total for the two Peninsula cities is 71,238.
Thus, 71,238 is the average daily number of people who
live in either Hampton or Newport News, but are employed
Southside plus those people that live Southside, but are
employed in either Hampton or Newport News.12 Most of these
people would pay a toll – twice a day – if RT17, the MMMBT
and the HRBT were tolled in order to pay for a third crossing.
If approximately 20 percent of these commuters carpool, use mass transportation
or telecommute, then we still are left with about 57,000 vehicles that cross
the James River each day because of their employment. Add to this perhaps
25,000 daily business trips and about the same number of discretionary trips,
and the total average estimated trips nears 110,000.

Future,” April 10, 2005, http://www.roadstothefuture.com/
HR_Crossing_Study.html#PPP-2001
If placing tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK has generated problematic results, then
consider what would happen if all vehicles using the three major un-tolled James
River crossings (the Route 17 Bridge, the Monitor-Merrimac Memorial BridgeTunnel and the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel) were subjected to tolls. These
three James River crossings (which we abbreviate as RT17, MMMBT and HRBT,
respectively) likely would be tolled if a third crossing over the James River were
constructed. A third crossing would have cost $2.7 billion a decade ago and
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12

 ote that there are other people who live or work in locations such as Poquoson, James City County and
N
Williamsburg that also commute across the James River.

TABLE 3
WORKERS CROSSING THE JAMES RIVER ON A DAILY BASIS:
THE FLOW OF MAJOR CITY WORKERS OVER THE RT17
BRIDGE, MMMBT AND HRBT
Hampton to
Chesapeake

3,162

Chesapeake to
Hampton

3,469

Hampton to Norfolk

6,484

Norfolk to Hampton

3,910

Hampton to
Portsmouth

1,721

Portsmouth to
Hampton

1,956

Suffolk to Hampton

2,103

Virginia Beach to
Hampton

5,088

Hampton to Suffolk

885

Hampton to Virginia
Beach

3,631

Totals

15,883

16,526

Hampton Total: 32,409
Newport News to
Chesapeake

3,288

Chesapeake to
Newport News

4,819

Newport News to
Norfolk

5,236

Norfolk to Newport
News

3,973

Newport News to
Portsmouth

1,881

Portsmouth to Newport
News

3,518

Newport News to
Suffolk

1,355

Suffolk to Newport
News

4,659

3,724

Virginia Beach to
Newport News

6,376

Newport News to
Virginia Beach
Totals

15,484

23,345

Newport News Total: 38,829
To the Southside Total 31,367

To the Peninsula Total

39,871

Grand Total, “to and from”: 71,238
Source: James V. Koch, “The Different Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014

One can quibble with the precise nature of these estimates; they are
approximations. Even so, the broad lessons of these numbers can
be grasped easily. The cities and counties of our region are highly
interdependent. Anything that reduces or frustrates this economic
interdependence will make us worse off. Significant tolls on
the three currently non-tolled James River crossings would fall
into that category because they would increase costs, diminish
the size of our market, reduce labor mobility and cause our
incomes to stagnate or decline. Viewed from a national perch,
significant James River tolls would do much to make our
region noncompetitive.

Summing It Up
A variety of independent studies have predicted that the overall economic
impact of the DTT/MTT/MLK project on Hampton Roads will be positive. These
studies rely upon “present value” estimates that collapse future revenues and
costs into current dollars so that, for example, costs and revenues in 2040 can
be compared to costs and revenues in 2016. This is conventional practice in
economics and finance, and the studies cannot be faulted for their methodology.
The conclusion, however, is that this project, when completed, will be good for
our region.
However, a finding that discounted benefits of the project
exceed its discounted costs for Hampton Roads as a region
does not guarantee that all cities and counties in our region
will experience the same proportionate benefits and costs.
Indeed, perhaps the most important lesson here is that the
benefits and costs of the project are unequally distributed
across Hampton Roads. Much depends upon the locations where people
actually live and work, which businesses and institutions attract out-of-town
customers and guests, and the behavior of discretionary drivers.
Norfolk, Portsmouth and Suffolk are the cities most affected by the tolls.
Portsmouth in particular appealed to the Commonwealth for relief, and Gov.
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Terry McAuliffe delayed the full onset of the tolls until 2016 by providing the
project with what has been advertised as $82 million in toll revenue subsidies.
Prospects for significant long-term financial assistance to the cities are not good,
however.
Accordingly, the cities should consider:
•S
 ubsidizing or rebating portions of tolls paid by citizens or
employees. Moffatt and Nichols’ useful 2012 report to Portsmouth focused
on ways that this city itself might subsidize or rebate toll payments.13 The cities
should consider jointly advocating a state income tax credit for cumulative
tolls paid by an individual above a certain level, say, $250 annually. This tax
credit easily could be tied to the size of someone’s taxable income in order to
focus it upon lower-income individuals and households. This would constitute
a drain on the Commonwealth’s treasury, but the drain would be much smaller
and more distributed over time than, say, a request for an additional $100
million in cash or debt contribution by the Commonwealth to the project. This
might appeal to toll payers elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The cities also
could rebate their own property taxes and the like on much the same basis.
• Additional tolling time periods. Daily vehicle traffic through the DTT
and MTT varies up to 30 percent during a typical week and much more than
this during a single day. ERCO has responded to these data by developing a
two-time period model – peak hours and non-peak hours – in terms of the tolls
it will charge. Experience at other toll sites nationally suggests that as many as
four distinct tolling time periods may be optimal.
• Additional tolling time periods would not cost ERCO revenue if the demand
for tolled travel were “unit elastic” or better. Practically, this means that a 10
percent reduction in tolls must result in a more than 10 percent increase in
toll customers, or a 20 percent reduction in tolls must cause a more than 20
percent increase in toll customers.
• The cities should request that ERCO experiment with additional tolling time
periods to determine the reaction of drivers. The aim would be to attract

13

“ City of Portsmouth Policy and Legislative Recommendations: Midtown and Downtown Tunnel Toll
Implementation,” Moffatt and Nichols, Aug. 27, 2012.
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more discretionary drivers (for example, those who might patronize a store or
restaurant, attend church or visit friends).
•E
 nhanced public transportation. The cities should do their utmost to
publicize Hampton Roads Transit’s Traffix website, www.gohrt.com/services/
traffix, where prospective car poolers can make contact with each other.
A three-person car pool slices two-thirds of the cost from the tolls paid by a
single passenger vehicle. Further, the cities should explore additional Elizabeth
River bus and ferry service with HRT.
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